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Abstract: The closing of Switzerland’s oldest bank Wegelin in early 2013 was a
symbolic moment for the Swiss banking industry. Add to Wegelin fourteen other
Swiss banks under fire by the U.S. Department of Justice for aiding tax evasion,
and Swiss banks no longer seem to be shrouded in a cloak of mystery. While
Switzerland is still the top destination for offshore wealth, U.S.’s Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) began implementation in 2014. This
Comment will argue that FATCA will fundamentally alter Switzerland’s status
as a safe haven for secret offshore accounts, as Swiss banks promise to
automatically provide the U.S. government with account information, and
cooperate with other international transparency measures picking up momentum
alongside FATCA. This Comment will also analyze FATCA’s impact on
Switzerland’s banking policies regarding the transparency of offshore accounts
used for foreign tax evasion and conclude by posing questions about the future
of Swiss banking industry.
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INTRODUCTION
In the film The World Is Not Enough, James Bond asks, “If you can’t
trust a Swiss banker, what’s the world come to?”1 We may have taken for
granted that few, if any, illicit transactions that Bond dashed after would
have existed without the help of Swiss bankers shuttling money around in
secret accounts. But the question that has recently come up is exactly that:
what if you can no longer trust a Swiss banker? The closing of
Switzerland’s oldest bank Wegelin in early 2013 was a symbolic moment
for the Swiss banking industry. A famed institution with 270 years of
history shuttered its doors within one year after being indicted by the U.S.
government for helping U.S. citizens avoid $1.2 billion in taxes through
offshore accounts.2 Add to Wegelin fourteen other Swiss banks under fire
by U.S. Department of Justice for aiding tax evasion,3 and Swiss banks no
longer seem to be shrouded in a cloak of mystery.4
Yet the real dagger aimed for the heart of Swiss secret banking has just
been thrown. Although Switzerland is still the top destination for $8.5
trillion of offshore wealth, managing $2.2 trillion in 2012,5 U.S.’s Foreign
Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) began implementation in 2014.6 In
this Comment, I will argue that FATCA will fundamentally alter
Switzerland’s status as a safe haven for secret offshore accounts, as Swiss
banks promise to automatically provide the U.S. government with account
information, and cooperate with other international transparency measures
picking up momentum alongside FATCA.
This Comment will analyze FATCA’s impact on Switzerland’s
banking policies regarding the transparency of offshore accounts used for
foreign tax evasion. Part II will give the background on history of Swiss
banking secrecy, U.S.-Swiss policies on secret banking, and major events
that led up to the enactment of FATCA. Part III will explain the key
provisions of FATCA, the two types of FATCA Intergovernmental
1

THE WORLD IS NOT ENOUGH (MGM Studios 1999).
See Nate Raymond & Lynnley Browning, Swiss Bank Wegelin to Close After Guilty Plea,
REUTERS,
Jan.
4,
2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/04/us-swissbank-wegelinidUSBRE9020O020130104.
3
See David Voreacos, Secret Swiss Accounts Said No Longer Safe for Tax Dodging, BLOOMBERG,
Sept. 8, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-08/secret-swiss-accounts-said-no-longer-safefor-tax-dodging.html.
4
See Offshore Tax Evasion: Swiss Finished?, THE ECONOMIST, Sep. 7, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21585009-america-arm-twists-bulkswitzerlands-banks-painful-deal-swiss (recent events have “fuel[ed] speculation that Switzerland could
lose its crown as the leading offshore financial centre”).
5
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, GLOBAL WEALTH 2013: MAINTAINING MOMENTUM IN A COMPLEX
WORLD 11 (2013), available at https://www.bcgperspectives.com/Images/Maintaining_Momentum_
Complex_World_May_2013_tcm80-135355.pdf.
6
See 2014-33 I.R.B. 1033, 1034 (2014).
2
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Agreements, and the mechanics of the 2013 U.S.-Switzerland
Implementation Agreement (U.S.-Swiss Agreement). Part IV will illustrate
how the current semi-automatic information exchange provision in the
U.S.-Swiss Agreement is a huge shift from previous Swiss information
exchange policies, and discuss how it will fundamentally change the Swiss
banking landscape. I will show that Switzerland is significantly affected by
its proactive efforts to comply with FATCA, which in turn challenges the
economics of the Swiss banking industry, in particular the nature of
Switzerland’s private banking business. Part V will then further assess how
FATCA’s impact on Switzerland is in line with recent international trends
for greater cross-border financial transparency. I will conclude by posing
questions about the future of Swiss banking industry.
I. SWISS SECRET BANKING POLICIES AND EVENTS LEADING
UP TO FATCA
Over the past century, Switzerland has developed a reputation for a
secret banking system that affords the ultimate privacy and protection for its
clients.7 Switzerland has become the ideal destination for tax evaders as a
depository of more than 25% of the world’s offshore wealth in 2012.8
Meanwhile, it has been estimated that individual tax evasion has cost the
U.S. government as much as $100 billion.9 In this section, I will describe
how Switzerland’s secret banking business, U.S. policies against secret
banking, various U.S.-Switzerland tax agreements, and the 2008 UBS tax
evasion scandal have set the stage for the passage of FATCA and U.S.’s
crackdown on tax evasion through secret Swiss accounts.
A. Swiss Banking Secrecy
Switzerland developed its financial and banking industry by
responding to Europe’s market needs after the World Wars. When many
countries experienced hyperinflation and exchange controls after World
War I, wealthy Europeans began investing their assets in more stable
countries including Switzerland.10 Swiss banks captured the market share of
individuals who wanted to hide their assets from government investigation
and feared the loss of their savings due to the instability in their home

7

See Urs Martin Lauchli, Swiss Bank Secrecy with Comparative Aspects to the American
Approach, 42 ST. LOUIS L.J. 865, 866 (1998); W. BLACKMAN, SWISS BANKING IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT 18 (1989).
8
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 5, at 11.
9
See JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40623, TAX HAVENS: INTERNATIONAL TAX
AVOIDANCE AND EVASION 23-4 (2013).
10
BLACKMAN, supra note 7, at 16–17.
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countries.11 By the end of Second World War, Switzerland had replaced
Brussels in its status as a leading banking hub.12
Yet it was the Swiss Banking Act that took Switzerland’s banking
reputation to the next level. Despite their early twentieth century success,
Swiss banks had to face the regulations of the Nazi government, which
enacted legislation in 1933 requiring citizens of the Nazi regime to declare
all of their foreign assets.13 So the Swiss Parliament in 1934 passed the
Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks (Swiss Banking Act), Article 47
of which established a code of secrecy for banking and account
information.14 It created the concept of banker-client privilege, akin to
lawyer-client privilege, that provided the utmost privacy to bank clients.15
The Swiss Banking Act sought to protect Switzerland’s economic
sovereignty in its banking system, and prevent individuals and other entities
from divulging financial information to foreign governments.16
Under the current Swiss law, banking secrecy is protected under both
civil and criminal codes.17 Civil law on bank secrecy exists in the Swiss
Civil Code and the Code of Obligation. Article 28(l) of the Swiss Civil
Code provides that a customer can petition a judge to bar a bank from
releasing private information.18 Article 27 of the Swiss Code of Obligation
gives a customer a cause of action against a bank for damages for violation
of secrecy and disclosure of private information.19 The Swiss Penal Code
complements the civil law by providing that bankers face criminal

11

See DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY 664 (1992); BLACKMAN, supra note 7,
at 18; EDOUARD CHAMBOST, BANK ACCOUNTS: A WORLD GUIDE TO CONFIDENTIALITY 6–7 (1983).
12
Matthew Allen, Roots of Wealth: History Back at Swiss Private Banking, SWISSINFO.CH, Feb. 22,
2013,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/History_bites_back_at_Swiss_private_banking.html?cid=350338
52.
13
See CHAMBOST, supra note 11, at 5.
14
See BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN [BANKG] [FEDERAL ACT ON BANKS
AND SAVINGS BANKS] Nov. 8, 1934, SR 952.0, art. 47 (Switz.) [hereinafter FEDERAL ACT ON BANKS
AND SAVINGS BANKS], available at http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/19340083/
201301010000/952.0.pdf.
15
See id. art. 47 (providing that any person who in his capacity as a body, employee, appointee or
liquidator of a bank, or employee of an auditing firm, attempts to induce an infraction of the professional
secrecy, is subject to imprisonment or fine).
16
See CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 664. Under Nazi laws, failure to report foreign holdings carried
the death penalty. See Bernhard F. Meyer, Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the U.S.,
14 NEW ENG. L. REV. 18, 26 (1979). Thus Switzerland felt an economic as well as political impetus to
enact banking law to protect itself from a serious threat to privacy. Id.
17
See ROSE-MARIE ANTOINE, CONFIDENTIALITY IN OFFSHORE FINANCIAL LAW 24 (2002).
18
See SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, art 28(1)
(Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS CIVIL CODE].
19
See SCHWEIZERISCHES OBLIGATIONENRECHT [OR] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS] Mar. 30, 1911, SR
220, art. 27 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS]. These policies for banking secrecy is
derived from contractual and agency principles. See CAMPBELL, supra note 11, at 664.
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prosecution if they divulge confidential information about their customers.20
Swiss Penal Code Article 271 prohibits financial institutions from acting on
behalf of a foreign government, and Article 273 makes it a crime for a
person to divulge secret business information to a foreign government
authority.21 Thus, this multi-layered legal protection of banking secrecy
fostered an environment for Switzerland to attract customers and flourish as
the most competitive wealth management center in the world.22
Unsurprisingly, Switzerland also became an attractive destination for U.S.
persons seeking to benefit from Swiss bank secrecy laws.23
B. U.S.-Swiss Policies on Secret Banking and Tax Avoidance Prior
to FATCA
While Swiss banks have faced no domestic civil or criminal liability
when assisting international clients shelter assets in Switzerland, they have
been subject to risk of liability and scrutiny by foreign governments,
including the U.S.24 Thus over the past fifty years, U.S. and Switzerland
entered into a number of agreements regarding bank secrecy and tax
avoidance.
To begin, the U.S. legal system generally views foreign bank secrecy
laws as promoting and facilitating illegal activity, and prosecutors have
attempted to enforce its national laws regardless of their possible effect on
foreign laws.25 While U.S. law recognizes that bankers owe a duty to not
disclose customer information to a third party, it does not recognize that
20

See SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 311.0, arts.
271 & 273 (Switz.) [hereinafter SWISS PENAL CODE]. The Swiss Penal Code instituted criminal
penalties for violation of the 1934 Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks. See CAMPBELL, supra note
11, at 667–68.
21
See SWISS PENAL CODE.
22
See DELOITTE CONSULTING AG, THE DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTRE RANKING
2013: MEASURING COMPETITIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN
SWITZERLAND
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Switzerland/
Local%20Assets/Documents/EN/Survey/Wealth%20management/2013/ch_en_Deloitte_International_
Wealth_Management_Centre_Rankings_2013.pdf [hereinafter DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT
CENTER RANKING 2013]. In Deloitte’s study, Switzerland came up on top when evaluated on a range of
47 successive indicators grouped into four areas of business environment, provider capability, stability,
and tax and regulatory factors. Id.
23
See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 69.
24
For example, Swiss banks were attacked for receiving Nazi-looted assets during the Second
World War, and denying access to family accounts for descendents of Holocaust victims. See The
Disposition of Assets Deposited in Swiss Banks by Missing Nazi Victims: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives, 104th Cong. 1–2 (1996) (statement of Rep.
Leach, Chairman, H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs.). The descendents brought suits against Swiss
banks in U.S. courts, and some of the claims have settled. See David E. Sanger, Swiss Banks Make Offer
on Nazi Loot, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/20/world/swiss-banksmake-offer-on-nazi-loot.html.
25
See Lauchli, supra note 7, at 878–79.
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privilege when it comes to government inquiries.26 In 1970, in response to
findings that secret bank accounts have been utilized by Americans to evade
income taxes and conceal assets,27 Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) to provide the IRS with access to bank records and facilitate criminal
and tax investigations for money laundering.28
Since then, the U.S. has engaged in a number of tax agreements with
Switzerland, principally to avoid international double taxation and prevent
tax avoidance and evasion.29 Like the U.S., Switzerland enters into tax
treaties with other nations to eliminate barriers against cross-border
economic transactions.30 Tax agreements are critical because the U.S. is a
key economic partner for Switzerland.31 The next paragraphs provide an
overview of the U.S.-Swiss tax agreements that were signed prior to
FATCA.
U.S. and Switzerland first entered into a tax treaty in 1951 (now
replaced by the 1996 Treaty),32 focused on administrative assistance for
eliminating double taxation of income.33 The treaty lacked any real bite on
tax avoidance; Switzerland agreed to exchange information only in criminal
cases involving “tax fraud,”34 a criminal offense narrowly defined under
Swiss law.35 Also, the Swiss authorities were not required to provide the
26

See id. at 877.
See Foreign Bank Secrecy and Bank Records: Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the H. Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 8 (1969–1970).
28
See Financial Recordkeeping and Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, Pub. L. No.
91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1118 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §1829(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951–
1959, and at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314, 5316–5325 (1994)).
29
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL TO
THE INCOME TAX TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SWITZERLAND (JCX-32-11) 6 (Comm.
Print 2011) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF 2009 PROTOCOL], available at https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=3791.
30
Switzerland’s
Double
Treaties,
KPMG,
http://www.kpmg.com/ch/en/topics/savingtax/pages/dba.aspx (last updated Nov. 2014).
31
For a discussion of the importance of the U.S. market to Switzerland, particularly in context of
Swiss banks, see infra notes 153–158.
32
See Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., May 24, 1951, 2 U.S.T.
1751, repealed by Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for
the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-8 [hereinafter 1951 Treaty].
33
See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 87TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF UNITED STATES TAX CONVENTIONS 2388 (Comm. Print 1962). The 1951 Treaty did not target tax
avoidance; it sought to eliminate double taxation by exemption in one of the countries or by applying
credit. Id. U.S. already had similar conventions in force with Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands,
Sweden, and the U.K. Id.
34
See 1951 Convention, supra note 32, art. XVI(1).
35
See BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS VERWALTUNGSSTRAFRECHT [VSTRR] [CRIMINAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW] March 22, 1974, SR 313.0, art. 14(2) (Switz.). According to a long line of Swiss
Supreme Court cases, tax fraud refers to tax avoidance of a significant amount when the taxpayer uses
forged or fortified documents or adopts fraudulent conduct to deceive the tax administration. XAVIER
27
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United States with the proof of the fraud for further U.S. proceedings.36
Thus, the first major U.S.-Swiss cooperation effort took place in 1973,
when the two countries agreed to a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (Swiss
MLAT) to combat organized crime.37 But because the Swiss MLAT was
ineffective for tax-related matters,38 the two countries signed the
Memorandum of Understanding (Swiss MOU) in 1982 for cooperation on
insider trading investigations.39 Switzerland pledged assistance by outlining
specific procedures for collecting and transmitting information to the
United States.40
The 1951 Treaty has been updated a number of times since its
inception, to varied results. In 1996, the United States and Switzerland
replaced the 1951 Treaty by improving the tax information exchange
provisions and broadening the definition of “tax fraud,”41 but the treaty
gave more attention to the limitation of its benefits to specific applicable
parties, rather than to an exchange of information.42 So the 1996 Treaty was
updated with a mutual agreement in 2003 to give way to “exchange
information necessary to properly implement the provisions of the
convention or to prevent tax fraud . . . .”43 In the 2003 Agreement, Swiss
authorities agreed to turn over account information if the United States
OBERSON & HOWARD R. HULL, SWITZERLAND IN INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 306 (4th ed. 2011).
36
OBERSON & HULL, supra note 35, at 281. The Switzerland Supreme Court judgment on May 16,
1975, ATF 101 Ib 160, found that the Swiss authorities do not have to provide proof in accordance with
U.S. implementing legislation. Id.
37
Treaty between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance
in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Switz., Jan. 23, 1977, 273 U.S.T. 2019 [hereinafter Swiss MLAT].
38
The Swiss MLAT generally excludes “violations with respect to taxes.” Id. art. 2.
39
See Memorandum of Understanding to Establish Mutually Acceptable Means for Improving
International Law Enforcement Cooperations in the Field of Insider Trading, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 31,
1982, 22 I.L.M. 1 (1983), reprinted in 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 39, at 1737 (Oct. 8, 1982)
[hereinafter Swiss MOU].
40
See id. at 7–11. In 1981, Switzerland also enacted into law the International Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, which allowed the United States and any other country to obtain legal assistance from
Switzerland if the offense was considered a crime in Switzerland, see BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER
INTERNATIONALE RECHTSHILFE IN STRAFSACHEN [IRSG] [FEDERAL ACT ON INTERNATIONAL MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS] Mar. 20, 1981, SR 351.1 (Switz.), http://www.admin.ch/opc/
en/classified-compilation/19810037/201301010000/351.1.pdf.
41
See Convention Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Switz., Oct. 2, 1996, S. Treaty
Doc. No. 105-8 [hereinafter 1996 Treaty] (defining tax fraud as referenced in Article 26 as, “fraudulent
conduct that causes or is intended to cause an illegal and substantial reduction in the amount of the tax
paid to a Contracting State”).
42
Compare id. art. 22 (Limitation of Benefits), with id. art. 26 (Exchange of Information). In
particular, The Memorandum of Understanding for the 1996 Treaty provides detailed explanation and
examples for Article 22 (Limitation of Benefits). See id.
43
See Mutual Agreement of January 23, 2003, Regarding the Administration of Article 26
(Exchange of Information) of the Swiss-U.S. Income Tax Convention of October 2, 1996, U.S.-Switz,
Jan. 30, 2003, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
mutual.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) [hereinafter 2003 Agreement].
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suspected that an individual was committing a “tax fraud” such as tax
evasion using offshore accounts.44 Thus, the 2003 Agreement broadened the
definition of “tax fraud” under the 1996 Treaty. However, it did not
elaborate on the implementation of the “exchange of information.”45
Finally, an amendment of the 1996 Treaty was proposed in 2011 to
inch towards “a more robust exchange of information” between the United
States and Swiss tax authorities.46 The Amendment based on a 2009
Protocol with Switzerland would change the standard for when Switzerland
has to produce tax-related information, moving from the highly restrictive
“tax fraud” standard to the less restrictive “may be relevant” standard.47
However, the United States has not been able to take advantage of such
information exchange system because the Amendment is still pending
ratification in the Senate.48 Therefore, while the United States has had a
number of agreements with Switzerland regarding tax evasion, it has not
been able to actually effectuate a successful information exchange
mechanism. This would change with FATCA.
C. The UBS Scandal and the Lead-up to FATCA
A major impetus to the enactment of FATCA was the UBS scandal in
2008. The UBS scandal first pointed out problems with the existing
qualified intermediary system for foreign financial institutions to report
U.S.-source income to the IRS and withhold taxes on that income. Then,
Switzerland’s compliant response to the UBS scandal set the stage to
44

See id. appendix (outlining 14 examples of tax evasion abuses considered “tax fraud,” each
involving tax evasion using offshore accounts).
45
See id. (lacking explanation of what “exchange of information” entails).
46
Message to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Amending the Swiss Confederation-United
States, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 52, at III (Jan. 26, 2011). The proposed 2011 Amendment seeks
to enter into law a Protocol signed between the United States and Switzerland on September 23, 2009, as
corrected by an exchange of notes effected on November 16, 2010, together with a related agreement
effected by an exchange of notes on the same day. Id. The Protocol would give IRS greater access to
Swiss banking records, and improve tax information exchange in a number of ways. See S. PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 113TH CONG., OFFSHORE TAX EVASION: THE EFFORT TO COLLECT
UNPAID TAXES ON BILLIONS IN HIDDEN OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS 35-37 (2014) [hereinafter OFFSHORE
TAX EVASION REPORT]. The Protocol was signed into law in Switzerland in 2012, but has not yet been
ratified by the Senate. Id. at 37. During the February 26, 2014 Senate Hearing, Credit Suisse pointed to
the Senate’s failure to ratify the Protocol as the reason that the bank could not provide names of U.S.
customers. See Joel Schectman, Credit Suisse: Senate Forcing Banks to Keep Secrets, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
27, 2014, 11:03 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/27/credit-suisse-senate-forcingswiss-banks-to-keep-secrets/.
47
EXPLANATION OF 2009 PROTOCOL, supra note 29, at 18. The Amendment follows the U.S.
Model Income Tax Convention and the OECD standards for exchange of tax information. See Message
to the Senate Transmitting the Protocol Amending the Swiss Confederation-United States, supra note
46, at III.
48
Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/
pending/index.htm (last updated Sept. 18, 2014).
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implement a more robust information exchange program—FATCA.
1. The UBS Scandal and Its Illumination of Problems with the
Qualified Intermediary System
The Swiss and U.S. perspectives on banking secrecy came to a headon collision with the UBS scandal. The U.S. Department of Justice’s
investigation into UBS AG, a titan in Swiss private banking,49 revealed that
the bank’s clients used undeclared Swiss Bank accounts to avoid reporting
$20 billion of income to the IRS.50 This information came to light in 2007
with the confessions by Bradley Birkenfeld, a former UBS private banker
who provided the IRS detailed accounts of how he helped U.S. taxpayers
evade paying millions in U.S. taxes.51 The Department of Justice responded
by filing a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Florida requesting for leave to serve IRS administrative summons (John
Doe Summons) with UBS, asking to disclose the names of all U.S. clients
for whom the bank had not filed forms with the IRS disclosing their Swiss
accounts.52
In response to the UBS scandal, the Senate Permanent Subcommittee
on Investigations (PSI) in July 2008 held publicized hearings on offshore
accounts.53 The hearings addressed shortcomings with the current IRS
program to pursue offshore accounts, the Qualified Intermediary (QI)
system that has been effective since 2001.54 The QI system requires foreign
banks to enter into Qualified Intermediary Agreements with the IRS, to
identify and document any customers who hold U.S. investments or have
received U.S.-source income into their offshore accounts, and withhold
49

In 2009, UBS and Credit Suisse together occupied about half of Switzerland’s private banking
market. KPMG SWITZ & UNIV. OF ST. GALLEN, PRIVATE BANKING IN SWITZERLAND: QUO VADIS? 5
(2009), available at https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/57055.pdf.
50
See Pascal Fletcher & Lisa Jucca, UBS, U.S. Settle Tax Evasion Case, REUTERS, Aug. 12, 2009,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/us-ubs-tax-idUSTRE57B2CF20090812.
51
See Laura Saunders et al., Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2012, 7:24
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10000872396390444017504577645412614237708.
Through an ironic turn of events, Birkenfeld, who in 2008 pled guilty to conspiracy for tax avoidance,
won a $104 million whistle-blower award from the IRS. See Tom Schoenberg & David Voreacos, UBS
Whistle-Blower Secures $104 Million Award From IRS, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 11, 2012, 9:03 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/ubs-whistle-blower-birkenfeld-secures-irs-award-lawyerssay.html.
52
See Memorandum in Support of Ex Parte Petition for Leave to Serve “John Doe” Summons at 6,
In the Matter of the Tax Liabilities of John Does, No. 08-21864 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
53
See Tax Haven Banks and U.S. Tax Compliance: Hearings Before the S. Permanent Subcomm.
on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 110th Cong. 9
(2008) [hereinafter Tax Haven Banks Hearings].
54
See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 110TH CONG., TAX HAVEN BANKS AND
U.S. TAX COMPLIANCE: STAFF REPORT 87 (2008) [hereinafter TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT]; Rev. Proc.
2000-12, 2000-01 C.B. 387.
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income tax from payments of U.S.-source income received by foreigners.55
The hearings illuminated flaws in the design of the QI system. The
most obvious issue is that a low percentage of U.S. income flows in through
QIs.56 The QI system also only requires reporting on U.S.-source income
and not foreign-source income,57 and does not require a look-through of
foreign shell entities to determine the actual beneficial owner of the
income.58 And while QIs have in place an auditing regime with external
auditors, the auditors are not required to follow up on indications of fraud
or illegal acts by the QI.59
The PSI hearings prompted a policy action. The hearings revealed that
UBS helped its U.S. clients structure their foreign accounts to avoid QI
reporting to the IRS.60 In response, then-IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman
testified that the IRS was “taking a number of steps to enhance the QI
program.”61 This mobilized the conversation for a stronger reporting regime
for offshore accounts.62 In October 2009, the House and the Senate
introduced the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),63 seeking
to address gaps in the QI system with a penalty withholding tax feature to
increase compliance.64
FATCA was ushered into law on March 18, 2010, as part of the Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act.65 For foreign companies, key
55

26 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1443 (2013). See also Rev. Proc. 2000-12, supra note 54; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-99, TAX COMPLIANCE: QUALIFIED INTERMEDIARY PROGRAM
PROVIDES SOME ASSURANCE THAT TAXES ON FOREIGN INVESTORS ARE WITHHELD AND REPORTED,
BUT CAN BE IMPROVED 10 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/280/270588.pdf [hereinafter
GAO REPORT].
56
See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 14. For example, in 2003, about 88% of U.S.-source income
reported to IRS were not reported by QIs. Id.
57
I.R.C. § 1441(a) (2013); see TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 22.
58
See GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 22. IRS regulations allow withholding agents (domestic and
QIs) to accept documentation declaring corporations’ ownership of income at face value, unless they
have “a reason to know” that it is invalid. Rev. Proc. 2008-12, § 5.10.
59
TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 24; GAO REPORT, supra note 55, at 27.
60
TAX HAVEN BANKS REPORT, supra note 54, at 16.
61
Tax Haven Banks Hearings, supra note 53, at 60 (statement of I.R.S. Comm’r Doug Shulman).
62
President Obama’s Fiscal 2010 budget included measures to combat offshore tax evasion. See
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2010
REVENUE PROPOSALS 41–58 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2010.pdf.
63
FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009, H.R. REP. NO. 111-3933 (2009); FOREIGN
ACCOUNT TAX COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009, S. REP. NO. 111-1934 (2009); see STAFF OF J. COMM. ON
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-18-10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX
COMPLIANCE ACT OF 2009 (2009).
64
See Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 111th Cong. 10 (2009) (statement of
Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury) [hereinafter Foreign Bank Account Reporting
Hearings].
65
Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 501, 124 Stat. 71 (codified
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FATCA provisions require foreign financial institutions (FFIs) to enter into
an agreement with the IRS (FFI Agreement).66 They then must undertake
certain identification and due diligence measures regarding their
accountholders, report annually to the IRS on their U.S. accountholders,
and in certain situations withhold and pay to the IRS 30% of any payments
of U.S.-source income.67 Thus, FATCA sought to create a “powerful
incentive for foreign financial institutions to provide the IRS with the
information it needs to identify persons seeking to evade U.S. tax.”68
2. Swiss Compliance with IRS Requests
After FATCA was enacted, there still lingered a big question whether
Switzerland, a country with a large number of secret U.S. accounts,69 would
actively participate in the new information-reporting program. Switzerland
signaled its answer to this question by acquiescing to U.S. requests for
account information in the aftermath of the UBS scandal.
To settle the criminal charges from John Doe summons, UBS agreed
to pay a $780 million penalty and pass on financial data of certain U.S.
clients.70 However, UBS initially did not comply with U.S. government
standards, only releasing the names of about 300 individuals who had
committed the narrow Swiss Penal Code definition of “tax fraud” of
“affirmative acts of fraud or deception.”71 So in February 2009, the
Department of Justice filed another civil lawsuit against UBS to seek the
identities of 52,000 more Americans suspected of hiding total of $15 billion
at the bank.72 UBS argued that Swiss law prevented them from providing
information about their clients, and the Swiss government forbid its
compliance.73 However, under a final three-party agreement between UBS,
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). FATCA was modified in 2009 before enacted into law.
See H.R. REP. NO. 111-4213 (2010); see also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., JCX-6009, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4213, THE “TAX EXTENDERS ACT OF 2009” (2009).
66
I.R.C. § 1471(b) (2012).
67
See I.R.C. § 1471 (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4 (2013).
68
Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 10 (statement of Stephen E. Shay,
Deputy Assistant Sec’y of the Treasury).
69
For example, Credit Suisse, as of 2006, “had over 22,000 U.S. customers with Swiss accounts
whose assets, at their peak, exceeded 12 billion (CHF)” (about $13 billion). OFFSHORE TAX EVASION
REPORT, supra note 46, at 3. Most of these accounts were undeclared. Id.
70
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 3, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/UBS_Signed_Deferred_Prosecution_
Agreement.pdf.
71
See Declaration of Barry B. Shott at 6, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2009),
2009 WL 3061580. For the Swiss definition of tax fraud, see supra note 35.
72
See Petition to Enforce John Doe Summons at 1, U.S. v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Feb.
19, 2009), 2009 WL 864716.
73
Brief of UBS AG in Opposition to the Petition to Enforce the John Doe Summons at 40, United
States v. UBS AG, No. 09-20423 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2009), 2009 WL 1612393.
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the Swiss government, and the United States on August 19, 2009, UBS
agreed to disclose the names of 4,450 U.S. account holders suspected by the
IRS of evading taxes.74
The UBS settlement created the foundation for Swiss compliance with
IRS requests.75 Since the UBS scandal, Swiss attitude towards the U.S.
crackdown on tax evasion can be described of as one of appeasing
compliance. Fourteen additional major Swiss banks, including Credit
Suisse, came under criminal investigation by prosecutors across the country
for aiding tax evasion.76 Wegelin, the oldest Swiss bank, was indicted, pled
guilty, and then filed for bankruptcy in 2013.77 To prevent other banks from
suffering the same fate as Wegelin, Switzerland negotiated a nonprosecution agreement with the United States in August 2013 that requires
Swiss banks to voluntarily come forward, disclose undeclared American
assets on their books, and pay related penalties.78 By January 2014, 106 of
74

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Swiss Confederation on the Request
for Information from the Internal Revenue Service of the United States of America Regarding UBS AG,
a Corporation Established Under the Laws of the Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/us-swiss_government_agreement.pdf [hereinafter U.S.Swiss Final UBS Agreement]. In return for the names, the U.S. Department of Justice decided to
withdraw the summons for names of 52,000 Americans accused of hiding assets in Swiss accounts. See
id. at 3.
75
See Settlement Agreement at 2, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 19, 2009, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/bank_agreement.pdf. UBS agreed to provide information about account
holders with accounts subject to the treaty request, based on an established criterion to the Swiss Federal
Tax Administration. Id.
76
See David Voreacos, Secret Swiss Accounts Said No Longer Safe for Tax Dodging, BLOOMBERG
(Sep. 3, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-08/secret-swiss-accounts-said-nolonger-safe-for-tax-dodging.html. Four Credit Suisse Group AG bankers were indicted in February
2011, then three more in July 2011, for conspiring to help U.S. clients evade taxes through secret bank
accounts. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Adami, et al., No. 1:11-95 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2011);
Superseding Indictment at 2, United States v. Walder, et al., No. 1:11-95 (E.D. Va. Jul. 21, 2011). In
2011, Credit Suisse set aside $324 million to deal with this issue, but the Department of Justice ended up
settling with the bank for $2.6 billion. See John Letzing, Francesco Guerrera, & David Enrich, Credit
Suisse Settlement with U.S. Could Top $800 Million, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2014, 5:50 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304632204579336671237500260;
Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, Credit Suisse Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to
Aid and Assist U.S. Taxpayers in Filing False Returns (May 19, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/credit-suisse-pleads-guilty-conspiracy-aid-and-assist-us-taxpayers-filingfalse-returns.
77
See Raymond & Browning, supra note 2.
78
See Joint Statement Between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Swiss Federal Department
of Finance, U.S.-Switz., Aug. 29, 2013, available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/
7532013829164644664074.pdf [hereinafter 2013 Joint Statement]. The banks that take part in the nonprosecution program are required to provide details on American accounts, “inform on banks that
transferred money into secret accounts or that accepted money when secret accounts were closed,” and
“reveal all cross-border activities and close accounts of Americans evading taxes..” Robert W. Wood,
Swiss Bank Frey To Close Over IRS Investigation, FORBES (Oct. 17, 2013, 11:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/10/17/swiss-bank-frey-to-close-over-irs-investigation/.
“The fines for banks are set in tiers based on time.” For example, “banks that held accounts as of August
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some 300 Swiss banks signed onto the program,79 the goal of which was to
“enable every Swiss bank that is not already under criminal investigation to
find a path to resolution.”80 This series of events set up an environment for
Swiss compliance with FATCA.81
In addition to its dealings with the United States, Switzerland also
made attempts to comply with international transparency standards by
signing twelve bilateral tax cooperation agreements with OECD members.82
In 2013, Switzerland signed the OECD Tax Convention to become the 58th
country to join the OECD’s convention on sharing tax information with
foreign tax authorities.83 As Switzerland responds to pressure from the
United States to help fight tax evasion, its actions signal how Swiss political
support for bank secrecy may have diminished in the recent years.84
II. FATCA AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN SWITZERLAND
Since its 2010 enactment, FATCA has been at the center of both
revelation and criticism as the world geared up for its official rollout in
1, 2008, must pay a fine equal to 20% of the top dollar value of all non-disclosed accounts.” Id.
However, fourteen banks already under investigation by the U.S. government are excluded from the
agreement. See 2013 Joint Statement, supra note 78, at § I.A.
79
June 2014 Update on the Tax Division’s Program for Non-Prosecution Agreements or NonTarget Letters for Swiss Banks, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 5, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/
june-2014-update-tax-division-s-program-non-prosecution-agreements-or-non-target-letters.
80
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Public Affairs, United States and Switzerland
Issue Joint Statement Regarding Tax Evasion Investigations (Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-and-switzerland-issue-joint-statement-regarding-taxevasion-investigations.
81
Note that Swiss banks are generally uneasy about the non-prosecution program: most of the
banks surveyed by EY have “somewhat negative” or “negative” view of the effect of the disclosure
program on Switzerland as a financial center. ERNST & YOUNG, EY BANKING BAROMETERS 2014:
NEW REALITIES IN SWISS BANKING 18 (2014).
82
See Mathieu van Berchem, Switzerland Passes OECD Grey List Hurdle, SWISSINFO.CH (June 1,
2011, 10:41 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/Specials/Rebuilding_the_financial_sector/News,_
results,_regulations/Switzerland_passes_OECD_grey_list_hurdle.html?cid=3037085. As result of the
UBS scandal, Switzerland was added to OECD’s “Grey List” of tax havens in 2009, and had to sign
bilateral agreements to get off the list. Id.
83
Switzerland Signs OECD Tax Convention, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2013, 9:36 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/10/15/us-oecd-switzerland-idINBRE99E0MV20131015.
84
Switzerland’s current Finance Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf has pushed for greater
administrative assistance and disclosure to fight international tax evasion. Switzerland’s Parliament and
Federal Council have taken legislative actions in this effort. See Swiss Edge Further Away from Bank
Secrecy with New Tax Steps, REUTERS (Oct. 9, 2013, 8:54 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2013/10/09/us-swiss-tax-idUSBRE9980IW20131009 (describing that Switzerland is bowing
under pressure from the United States and the EU to end bank secrecy); Catherine Bosley, Swiss
Bankers Stripped of Secrecy as Data Swap Embraced, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2013, 5:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-17/swiss-bankers-stripped-of-secrecy-as-minister-embracesdata-swap.html (reporting that Switzerland’s interactions with the United States signal “cleaning-up of
the legacies,” and that the country is heading toward automatic exchange of information).
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2014.85 The United States has successfully negotiated a number of
intergovernmental agreements, including with Switzerland, to facilitate
FATCA’s implementation around the world. In this section, I will first
highlight the key features of FATCA. Next, I will describe the two types of
FATCA model intergovernmental agreements. This will then segue into an
explanation of the U.S.-Swiss Agreement.
A. Mechanics of FATCA
FATCA was designed to strengthen U.S. law in tax withholding
procedures and weak information arrangement between countries.86 It boils
down to a two-prong approach: first, disclosure requirements for U.S.
taxpayers with foreign accounts,87 and second, more controversial
requirements for “foreign financial institutions” (FFIs).88 This section will
focus on the requirements for FFIs.
In a nutshell, FFIs have to sign an agreement with the IRS (FFI
Agreement) to identify the residency status of their clients, and provide the
IRS with U.S. account information.89 FFIs are broadly defined:90 in addition
to banks, non-U.S. entities such as broker/dealers, insurance companies,
hedge funds, securitization vehicles, and private equity funds are considered
85

FATCA has faced great opposition domestically and internationally because of the associated
costs, capital flight risk, and problems with implementation, and so some pressed for the act to be
repealed. See, e.g., RepealFatca.com Is a Website Dedicated to Getting Rid of the Worst Law Most
Americans Have Never Heard of, REPEAL FATCA, http://www.repealfatca.com/ (last visited March 5,
2015). Scholars have emphasized the need for multinational cooperation for FATCA to work. See, e.g.,
J. Richard (Dick) Harvey, Jr., Offshore Accounts: Insider’s Summary of FATCA and Its Potential
Future, 57 VILL. L. REV. 471 (2012); Susan C. Morse, Ask for Help, Uncle Sam: The Future of Global
Tax Reporting, 57 VILL. L. REV. 529 (2012). The strength of arguments for repeal of FATCA has
diminished since 2010-2011, as the United States’ battle against offshore tax evasion has gained
momentum. William Hoffman, Former IRS Head Miller Unsure if FATCA’s Benefits Outweigh Costs,
TAX
ANALYSTS
(Oct.
7,
2014),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsf/Features/
1BF1D85CF640117A85257D6B00537F71?OpenDocument. As of spring 2015, the United States has
signed bilateral IGAs with fifty-five jurisdictions. Resource Center, FATCA - Archive, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA-Archive.aspx,
(last visited Mar. 5, 2015) [hereinafter FATCA Resource Center].
86
Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 9–10. Note that there have been
bills proposed to update or amend parts of the FATCA to heighten the stringency of FATCA
enforcement. See, e.g., Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 174, 114th Cong. (2015); Cut Unjustified Tax
Loopholes Act, S. 268, 113th Cong. (2013).
87
See I.R.C. § 6038D(a) (2012). Individual U.S. taxpayers with foreign accounts and assets
exceeding $50,000 on the last day of the tax year have to report them on an information return. Id.
88
See I.R.C. § 1471.
89
See id.
90
FFIs include any foreign entity that accepts deposits, holds financial assets for others as a
substantial portion of its business, or engages in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities, partnership interests, or commodities. See id. 1471(d)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(b)(3)
(2013).
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FFIs.91
FFIs have to sign up with the IRS and comply with a number of
reporting requirements. FFIs must obtain information for each account
holder to determine whether the account is a “U.S. account”—an account of
a U.S. person or foreign entity with substantial U.S. ownership.92 Under
Final Treasury Regulations for FATCA, FFIs have to conduct a stringent
due diligence and verification process to identify, document, and classify
existing client relationships.93 FFIs then have to report information on U.S.
account holders to the IRS.94 Required information includes account
balance or value of each U.S. account,95 as well as amount of dividends,
interest, other income, and gross proceeds from the sale of property credited
to a U.S. account.96
While FATCA is theoretically “voluntary,” FFIs that do not sign an
agreement with the IRS are subject to a 30% withholding tax on U.S.derived income including interest, dividends, gross proceeds from
disposition of U.S. securities, and pass-through payments.97 Also, U.S.
account holders that do not provide requested information to FFIs in order
to comply with FFI Agreements will be considered “recalcitrant account
holders”98 and FFIs must withhold a 30% tax on the U.S.-source payments
it makes to those account holders.99
B. FATCA Intergovernmental Agreements
The IRS has recognized that the international reach of FATCA could
be at odds with local laws, and that foreign government cooperation will be
necessary to enforce FATCA around the globe.100 With that in mind, the
91

DELOITTE DEVELOPMENT LLC, FATCA FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.deloitte.com/assets/dcom-unitedstates/local%20assets/documents/tax/us_tax_fatca_faqs_061
711.pdf.
92
See I.R.C. § 1471(d)(1).
93
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY & INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, REGULATIONS RELATING TO
INFORMATION REPORTING BY FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND WITHHOLDING ON CERTAIN
PAYMENTS TO FOREIGN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND OTHER FOREIGN ENTITIES 38, 39 (2013); Treas.
Reg. § 1.1471-4(c).
94
See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4(d)(3).
95
See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5.
96
See I.R.C. § 1471(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-4.
97
See I.R.C. § 1471(b).
98
See id. § 1471(d)(6).
99
See id. § 1471(b)(1)(D)(i).
100
When the Treasury issued Proposed FATCA Regulations in February 2012, it also issued a joint
statement with France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom Regarding an Intergovernmental Approach to Improving international Tax Compliance and
Implementing FATCA (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/taxpolicy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Fr-Ger-It-Sp-UK-02-07-2012.pdf.
In
the
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Treasury developed Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs), beginning with
the U.K. in 2012.101 Since then, the United States has signed bilateral IGAs
with more than fifty-five countries, and has reached agreements in
substance with fifty-seven additional jurisdictions.102
To facilitate IGAs, FATCA Model Agreement I (Model I) created a
framework that allows foreign institutions to report the necessary
information regarding U.S. accounts to their respective governments rather
than to IRS directly, while still avoiding FATCA withholding.103 Thus,
Model I provides for an automatic exchange of information between IRS
and the foreign tax authority.104 As defined by the OECD, automatic
exchange of information “involves the systematic and periodic transmission
of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country of income to the
country of residence of the taxpayer concerning various categories of
income.”105 The automatically exchanged information is collected by the
tax authorities in the source country and systematically sent to the tax
authorities in the residence country.106 Commentators favor this automatic
exchange of information for reasons including timeliness, early fraud
detection, deterrent effects that increase voluntary compliance, and ease of
administrability.107
With respect to Switzerland, the United States’ parallel joint
statements with Japan and Switzerland in June 2012 revealed an alternative
model agreement (Model II) for FATCA implementation.108 Under Model
statement, the six governments agreed to explore a common approach to FATCA implementation
through domestic reporting and reciprocal automatic exchange, based on six existing bilateral treaties.
Id.
101
See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to Improve international Tax Compliance and
to Implement FATCA, U.S.-U.K., Sep. 12, 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-Agreement-UK-9-122012.pdf. The fact that IGAs are not treaties means that they do not have to be ratified by U.S. Senate,
and can be concluded quickly. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 723.2-2
(2006).
102
See FATCA Resource Center, supra note 85.
103
Model IA (reciprocal) and Model IB (non-reciprocal) versions are available on Resource Center,
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
104
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the French Republic to Improve International Tax Compliance and to Implement
FATCA, U.S.-Fr., art. 3 ¶ 6, Nov. 14, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
BilateralAgreementUSFranceImplementFATCA.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-French Agreement].
105
See OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: THE NEXT STEP 3 (2013),
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/Background_Brief_AEOI_27082013.pdf.
106
See id. at 3–4.
107
See id. at 5; Itai Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304,
348-65 (2012).
108
See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and
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II, the financial institutions themselves have to send the names and data of
their customers directly to the IRS after obtaining consent from their
customers.109 Thus, the exchange of information is not between
governments as in Model I, but rather between the FFIs and the IRS.110 The
joint statements with Japan and Switzerland created a launch pad for the
agreement between the United States and Switzerland for implementation
of FATCA (the U.S.-Swiss Agreement), which was signed on February 14,
2013.111
C. The U.S.-Swiss Agreement
The U.S.-Swiss Agreement, based on Model II, requires Switzerland
to direct all reporting Swiss financial institutions to register with the IRS by
January 1, 2014, and to comply with FATCA due diligence, reporting, and
withholding requirements.112 Switzerland agreed to instruct reporting Swiss
financial institutions to request certain information from preexisting
account holders and report it to the IRS, and to obtain consent from new
account holders to report this information as a condition for opening the
account.113 The U.S.-Swiss Agreement guarantees Swiss financial
institutions that they will not be prosecuted in Switzerland if they report
bank information to the IRS.114 Otherwise, Swiss financial institutions
Switzerland Regarding a Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA (June
21,
2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-JointStatement-US-Switzerland-06-21-2012.pdf [hereinafter Joint Statement with Switzerland]; Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Joint Statement from the United States and Japan Regarding a
Framework for Cooperation to Facilitate the Implementation of FATCA and Improve International Tax
Compliance (June 21, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
FATCA-Joint-Statement-US-Japan-06-21-2012.pdf.
109
Compare Joint Statement with Switzerland, supra note 109, with Model I (where the FFIs do not
need to obtain consent or waiver from customers — all relevant information about U.S. account holders
is reported to local tax authorities, which then automatically report the information to the IRS.) Models I
and II confer different advantages and disadvantages regarding due diligence, information reporting,
withholding, enforcement, etc. See RAYMOND J. HOLST, JIYEON LEE-LIM & WILLIAM LU, LATHAM &
WATKINS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS UNDER FATCA: COMPARING THE TWO MODELS 2–5
(2013), available at https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/intergovernmental-agreements-under-fatca.
A potential FATCA partner has to consider its own priorities, and also weigh the benefits versus the
burdens under each model. Id. at 5.
110
See Joint Statement with Switzerland, supra note 109.
111
Agreement Between the United States of America and Switzerland for Cooperation to Facilitate
the Implementation of FATCA, U.S.-Switz., Feb. 13, 2013, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/FATCA-AgreementSwitzerland-2-14-2013.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-Swiss Agreement].
112
See id. art. 3.
113
See id. (FFIs have to collect information such as the name, address, and Tax Identification
Number of the U.S. account holder, the account number, the account balance or value, and payments
made with respect to the account holder); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.1471–4(d)(3).
114
See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 4.
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would have to make the difficult decision to either comply with FATCA or
face disclosure liability under the Swiss Penal Code.115 The Swiss
government has essentially lifted the veil of banking secrecy with respect to
U.S. customer information within the parameters of FATCA.
The mechanics of U.S.-Swiss Agreement operates as follows. In order
to service U.S. customers, a Swiss financial institution has to enter into a
FFI agreement with the IRS to comply with IRS reporting requirements
according to Final FATCA Regulations.116 Entering into a FFI agreement
eliminates the FFI’s 30% penalty tax on all payments of U.S.-source
income.117 After entering into a FFI agreement, the financial institution has
to receive consent from a U.S. person or U.S.-owned foreign entity in order
to supply their information to the IRS.118 If the account holder declines
consent, the financial institution cannot deliver individual information to
the IRS without violating Swiss banking secrecy rules still in effect.119
However, Swiss financial institutions will be required to annually
report “aggregate information” on non-consenting accountholders to the
IRS.120 The U.S. Competent Authority (the Secretary of Treasury) may then
use the aggregate information received as the basis for submitting a “group
request” for specific information.121 Upon receiving a group request, the
Swiss Federal Tax Administration (Swiss FTA) has to follow specific
procedures to provide the information to the U.S. Competent Authority.122
Swiss financial institutions are not required to withhold tax or close nonconsenting accounts unless a group request has been received and the Swiss
financial institution is unable to provide the Swiss FTA with information to
be exchanged with the IRS within eight months.123
In sum, the U.S.-Swiss Agreement is more cooperative than any of the
prior agreements with the United States regarding offshore tax evasion or
tax collection.
III. THE IMPACT OF FATCA ON THE SWISS BANKING
INDUSTRY
Since its introduction, FATCA has had and will continue to have a
significant impact on the Swiss banking industry. FATCA turned the Swiss
banks’ long-held tradition of secrecy upside down, and the banking industry
115

For discussion on Swiss laws on bank secrecy, see supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 3 ¶ 1(a).
117
See id. art. 6.
118
See id. art. 3 ¶ 1(b)(i).
119
See id. art. 7 ¶ 1.
120
See id. art. 5 ¶ 1.
121
See id.
122
See id. art. 5 ¶ 3.
123
See id. art. 7 ¶ 1(b).
116
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is witnessing the micro and macro-level economic impacts of its
implementation. In this section, I will first show that the semi-automatic
nature of information exchange in the U.S.-Swiss Agreement creates a new
standard for banking transparency in Switzerland, in sharp contrast to
Switzerland’s previous information exchange policies. Then I will explain
Switzerland’s incentives to proactively comply with FATCA, and the
additional measures it introduced to facilitate its compliance. Finally, I will
describe how Switzerland’s compliance with FATCA is reshaping the look
and character of the Swiss banking industry and affecting the
competitiveness of Swiss banks in the world stage.
A. A Semi-Automatic Exchange of Information: A Huge Shift for
Switzerland
The current U.S.-Swiss Agreement provides for a Model II “semiautomatic exchange of information,”124 a level of disclosure that represents
a huge step toward transparency for Switzerland. In the context of
Switzerland’s legal construct for secret banking, where bankers are subject
to criminal penalties if they do not protect the identities of their clients,125
the U.S.-Swiss Agreement’s provision for systematic exchange of account
information presents a stark juxtaposition.
Although the U.S.-Swiss Agreement does not provide for a completely
automatic exchange of information as defined by the OECD,126 and there is
no reciprocity requirement in law127 for U.S. institutions to disclose the
124

Armando Mombelli, FATCA Sounds Death Knell of Banking Secrecy, SWISSINFO.CH, May 28,
2013,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/business/FATCA_sounds_death_knell_of_banking_secrecy.html?
cid=35956046.
125
See supra Part III.A.
126
According to the OECD, automatic exchange of information “involves the systematic and
periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer information by the source country of income to the country of
residence of the taxpayer concerning various categories of income.” See supra notes 105–107 and
accompanying text.
127
FATCA was written as a unilateral system for foreign financial institutions to provide
information, but the Treasury has negotiated a number of IGAs with promises of reciprocity on United
States’ part. See, e.g. Agreement Between the Department of Treasury of the United States of America
and the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit of the United Mexican States to Improve International
Tax Compliance Including with Respect to FATCA, U.S.-Mex., art. 6(1), Apr. 17, 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Documents/
FATCA-Agreement-Mexico-4-17-2014.pdf. To move towards reciprocity, the Treasury has
promulgated regulations to require U.S. banks and credit unions to report information on interest paid to
nonresident aliens. 26 C.F.R §§ 1.6049-4(b)(5)–8. Additionally, Treasury’s Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to facilitate reporting and tax
compliance investigation in order to advance international commitments made through FATCA
reciprocal IGAs. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Issues Proposed Rules to Enhance
Financial Transparency (July 30, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/
jl2595.aspx; Jay R. Nanavati, United States: Treasury’s FinCEN Proposes Rules Forcing U.S. Financial
Institutions To Collect Data For FATCA Reciprocity, NASDAQ, Aug. 5, 2014,
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same information to Swiss authorities, the Agreement has many of the
features that an automatic exchange of information system aims for. The
U.S.-Swiss Agreement is a two-step information exchange: while the main
exchange is between the financial institution and the IRS, the Swiss FTA
steps in upon a group request and delivers information to the U.S.
authorities when there is hindrance from non-consenting account holders.128
Thus, there is a “systemic and periodic transmission of ‘bulk’ taxpayer
information by the source country of income to the country of residence of
the taxpayer” as is the case for a completely automatic system.129
Moreover, the U.S.-Swiss Agreement is even more remarkable when
compared to other multilateral tax agreements that Switzerland has recently
engaged in. In the few years prior to FATCA, Switzerland entered into
“Rubik Agreements”130 with key trading partners Austria, Germany and the
U.K. that focused on anonymous tax withholding as a substitute for
automatic information exchange for non-Swiss residents holding Swiss
accounts.131 For example, the Swiss-Austria agreement requires Swiss
banks to levy a 25% withholding tax on future investment income and
capital gains of Austrian tax residents equal to the Austrian capital yields
tax.132 The Swiss banks then transfer the proceeds of the withholding tax to
the Austrian Ministry of Finance.133 Once the Swiss banks impose the
withholding tax, the tax resident’s Austrian tax obligation is fulfilled.134
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/332798/tax+authorities/Treasurys+FinCEN+Proposes+Rules+F
orcing+US+Financial+Institutions+to+Collect+Data+for+FATCA+Reciprocity.
128
See U.S.-Swiss Agreement, supra note 109, art. 5 ¶ 3.
129
See OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION: THE NEXT STEP, supra note 106, at 3.
130
The “Rubik” model (like the name of the famous puzzle) was created by the Swiss Association of
Foreign Banks to separate income from wealth and send tax at source to third countries, while
maintaining the Swiss bank account holder’s anonymity. See British Receive Initial Funds From Tax
Deal, SWISSINFO.CH, Jan. 30, 2013, http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/british-receive-initial-funds-from-taxdeal/34867206; see also infra notes 131-142 and accompanying text.
131
See Abkommen zwischen der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft und der Republik Osterreich
uber die Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Swiss
Confederation and Austria on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and Financial Markets], AustriaSwitz., Apr. 13, 2012 (Ger.), available at Http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/
attachments/26559.pdf [hereinafter Swiss-Austria Cooperation Agreement]; Agreement Between the
Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on Cooperation in
the Area of Taxation, U.K.-Switz., Oct. 6, 2011 [hereinafter Swiss-U.K. Cooperation Agreement];
Abkommen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft
uber Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Steuern und Finanzmarkt [Agreement Between the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Swiss Confederation on Cooperation in the Area of Taxation and
Financial Markets], Germ.-Switz., Sept. 21, 2011 (Ger), available at http://www.news.admin.ch/
NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/24360.pdf, [hereinafter Swiss-Ger. Cooperation Agreement].
132
The Austrian-Swiss Tax Agreement, NEWSLETTER (Baker & McKenzie, Vienna, Austria), April
2012, at 3, available at http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Austria/Newsroom
/NL_AustriaSwissTaxAgreement_Apr2012.pdf [hereinafter Baker & McKenzie Newsletter].
133
See id. at 4.
134
See id. at 3. Alternatively, Austrian taxpayers can authorize their Swiss bank to report their future
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Further, Switzerland reports to the partner country names of ten
jurisdictions to which the partner country residents who close their Swiss
accounts transfer the largest volume of assets, as well as the number of
partner country residents who moved funds out of Switzerland to those
jurisdictions.135 However, Switzerland does not have to disclose the actual
identity of those individuals.136 These arrangements are intended to
maintain client anonymity through anonymous withholding.137 The end
result encourages Switzerland’s partner country to pressure the jurisdictions
where the partner country’s residents move their money to create additional
Rubik Agreements with the partner country, further perpetuating Rubik
Agreements as the standard.138
In effect, the Rubik Agreements allow Swiss financial institutions to
opt for in-country tax withholding instead of bulk transmission of account
information back to the resident country.139 While there are a number of
significant administrative issues raised by this method,140 the anonymous
withholding method has been justified by Switzerland “as a means of
protect[ing] the financial privacy of account holders.”141 But from the
partner countries’ perspective, automatic exchange of information is
superior to anonymous withholding for reasons such as reaching untaxed
principle, maintaining a sense of fairness, and providing a multilateral
solution.142 Practically speaking, these anonymous withholding agreements
have hampered the emergence of automatic cross-border information
reporting system. Their endorsement by Switzerland, a major offshore asset
management center, has diminished Switzerland’s opportunity to lead other

investment income and capital gains directly to the Austrian Ministry of Finance. Id. at 4. Then the
withholding would not apply, but the taxpayer has to declare the income in his annual income tax return.
Id.
135
See Grinberg, supra note 108, at 342.
136
See id.
137
See id.
138
See id.
139
See id.
140
Swiss banks themselves have to compute and withhold the tax amounts for each customer after
figuring out their individual tax residency and assets in possession. Then the proceeds are remitted
anonymously to the partner country. See id. at 340–41.
141
See id. at 339. These anonymous withholding agreements assert that they achieve a level of
cooperation that would be “equivalent” to an automatic exchange of information. Id. at 342–43 (citing
Swiss-Austria Cooperation Agreement, supra note 133, art. 1; Swiss-U.K. Cooperation Agreement,
supra note 133, art. 1; Swiss-Ger. Cooperation Agreement, supra note 133, art. 1). Thus, Switzerland’s
ratification of these agreements with key financial centers would achieve a political goal of Swiss
policy, the acceptance of the idea that anonymous withholding is equivalent to automatic exchange of
information. Id. at 343.
142
See Anonymous Withholding Agreements and the Future of International Cooperation in Taxing
Foreign Financial Accounts: Testimony before the Finance Committee of the German Bundestag,
September 24, 2012 (statement by Associate Professor Itai Grinberg, Geo. U. L. Center), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2083&context=facpub.
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financial centers towards a more open exchange system.143
Thus, by agreeing to an exchange of information and supplying
detailed account information to the U.S. government instead of withholding
anonymously, the U.S.-Swiss FATCA Agreement represents a fundamental
shift from Switzerland’s previous information disclosure policies. More
remarkably, Switzerland has recently indicated an intention to negotiate a
reciprocal Model I IGA to replace its Model II IGA.144 This is a big step for
Switzerland — among other changes, going from Model II to Model I will
place a greater administrative burden for Switzerland because the Swiss tax
authority will act as an intermediary between FFIs and the IRS.145 On the
other hand, Model I’s automatic exchange of information between
governments reduces compliance costs for FFIs.146 Model I is the OECD’s
“preferred route for the implementation of FATCA,” and also serves as the
template for the common international model for automatic exchange of
information.147 Thus, the anticipated change will perpetuate the “Swiss
commitment to automatic exchange of information at the [g]lobal
[f]orum.”148
B. Changes in the Swiss Banking Landscape Due to FATCA
The Swiss banking landscape has already been shaped, and will
continue to be shaped by FATCA. This is because Switzerland is
economically incentivized to actively comply with FATCA despite its high
costs. Also, recent events in Switzerland continue to demonstrate the
country’s willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on tax related matters. In
turn, FATCA will have a significant impact on the nature of the Swiss
banking industry.
143

See Grinberg, supra note 108, at 340.
See Press Release, The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation, Automatic Exchange of
Information in Tax Matters: Federal Council Adopts Negotiation Mandates With Partner States (Oct. 8,
2014), available at http://www.admin.ch/aktuell/00089/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=54768 [hereinafter
Swiss Automatic Exchange of Information Press Release].
145
See id. For a discussion of differences between IGA Models I and II, see supra notes 103–111
and accompanying text.
146
See Press Release, OECD, Tax: OECD Welcomes Multilateral Efforts to Improve International
Tax Compliance and Transparency (Jul. 26, 2012), available at http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/
taxoecdwelcomesmultilateraleffortstoimproveinternationaltaxcomplianceandtransparency.htm.
147
OECD, AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION: BACKGROUND
INFORMATION BRIEF 5–6 (2014), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-taxinformation/Automatic-Exchange-Financial-Account-Information-Brief.pdf [hereinafter BACKGROUND
INFORMATION BRIEF]. Also, Model I is generally viewed as more attractive because it provides more
legal certainty and scope for implementation. SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING
GROUP, ACTIVELY SHAPING TRANSITION–FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR BANKING IN SWITZERLAND 12
(2014), available at http://shop.sba.ch/1000015_e.pdf. For a discussion on automatic exchange of
information as OECD’s new global standard, see infra notes 199, 200 and accompanying text.
148
Swiss Automatic Exchange of Information Press Release, supra note 146.
144
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1. Switzerland’s Proactive Compliance Efforts
It is evident that Switzerland is making proactive efforts to comply
with FATCA requirements. Swiss banks cannot escape FATCA because not
only is U.S. an important market, but the 30% penalty for FFIs are triggered
on their payments of U.S.-source income. Also, recent judicial and
parliamentary decisions in Switzerland indicate the country’s willingness to
comply with FATCA requirements.
To begin, while FATCA presents significant administrative burdens,
Swiss banks will make an effort to comply because of the importance of the
U.S. market for Swiss banks. Some of the criticisms of FATCA point to
reports that Swiss banks are denying accounts to U.S citizens in order to
evade FATCA compliance.149 There also seems to be evidence that U.S.
citizens are renouncing their citizenship to avoid U.S. taxation150 : the
number of people renouncing their U.S. citizenship set a new record in
2013, and a recent survey revealed that 76% of Americans abroad feel
incentivized to give up their U.S. passports.151 However, it is not feasible
for Swiss institutions to simply deny accounts to all U.S. individuals and
entities.152 The size of U.S. wealth still remains attractive for Swiss banks—
North America occupied 36% of global millionaire wealth in 2008, and its
share is expected to hover around 34% in 2016.153 As the CEO of private
Swiss bank Vontobel put it, “the U.S. is simply too big, too wealthy[,] and
too important.”154
149

See Foreign Bank Account Reporting Hearings, supra note 64, at 70 (noting that U.K., Swiss,
Dutch, and Spanish banks are refusing as clients U.S. citizens living in their countries).
150
Laura Saunders, Overseas Americans: Time to Say ‘Bye’ to Uncle Sam?; Chased by the U.S.
Government, Thousands Are Severing Ties With America. Here’s What You Need to Know, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 16, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323455104579014772169287210.html.
But note that renunciation of citizenship requires individuals to file back taxes, pay any penalties owed,
and also face exit tax on individuals with annual income of $150,000 or have a net worth of at least $2
million. I.R.C. § 877(a)(2) (2006).
151
Robert W. Wood, Americans Renounce Citizenship In New Record Numbers, FORBES, Oct. 30,
2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/10/30/americans-renounce-citizenship-in-recordnumbers-why-you-should-care/; Robert W. Wood, 5.5 Million Americans Eye Giving Up U.S.
Citizenship, Survey Reveals, FORBES, Oct. 27, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/
10/27/5-5-million-americans-eye-giving-up-u-s-citizenship-survey-reveals/.
152
See Kelly Phillips Erb, The Biggest Story in Banking, Thanks to IRS, FORBES, Mar. 21, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2012/03/21/the-biggest-story-in-banking-thanks-to-irs/2/.
153
MCKINSEY & COMPANY MCKINSEY GLOBAL PRIVATE BANKING SURVEY 2013: CAPTURING THE
NEW
GENERATION
OF
CLIENTS
10
(2013),
available
at
http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey%20offices/switzerland/latest%20thinking/private_
banking_survey_2013.ashx. Compare U.S.’s numbers with the market share of all of emerging markets
combined (Asia Pacific excluding Japan, Middle East, Latin America, Central Europe, Africa): 24% in
2008 and expected to rise to 37% in 2016. Id.
154
U.S. Wealth Market Still Attractive for Swiss Banks – Vontobel CEO, REUTERS, Sep. 12, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/12/vontobel-unitedstates-ceo-idUSL5N0H831J20130912. The
CEO commented that the profit margins in emerging markets “are less attractive than in the U.S.” Id.
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Additionally, refusing to accept U.S. account holders will not relieve a
FFI from being subject to FATCA because the 30% withholding tax for
FFIs that do not sign a FFI Agreement is triggered on their U.S.-source
income.155 Switzerland is among the top investors in the U.S.: Swiss
cumulative investment was estimated at $212 billion in 2013, and U.S.
represented 19.8% of Switzerland’s direct investment abroad in 2011.156
Also, Swiss finance and insurance affiliates are estimated to hold more than
$1.4 trillion in U.S. assets.157 So in order for FFIs to avoid 30% tax on
investments earned in the U.S., they have to comply with FATCA reporting
regulations. While FATCA may lead to Swiss institutions discouraging
U.S. investments, Swiss financial institutions ultimately will not be able to
overlook the significance of the U.S. capital market.158
Further, recent events in Switzerland reaffirm the country’s
willingness to cooperate with U.S. on tax evasion matters under specified
parameters. On July 5, 2013, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland
ruled that IRS’s “group requests” under the 1996 Treaty is permissible if
the requests include enough detail to establish grounds for suspicion of
fraud.159 Thus, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision that Credit
Suisse can reveal client data to U.S. authorities.160 Yet, with the 2011
Amendment to the 1996 Treaty still pending ratification in the U.S.
Senate,161 Switzerland is trying to ascertain the boundaries of this
decision.162 On January 6, 2014, the Federal Administrative Court in St.
155

See I.R.C. § 1471; Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-2.
EMBASSY OF SWITZERLAND IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, SWISS FOREIGN DIRECT
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT 2013 3, 4 (2013), available at http://www.sge.com/sites/default/files/FDI%20Switzerland-US_0.pdf.
157
Id. at 3.
158
See B.J. Henderson et al., World Markets for Raising New Capital, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 73–75
(2006) (finding that U.S. has the largest capital market in the world, and is home to 66% of the total
global cross-border equity issues). See also Stavros Peristiani, Evaluating the Relative Strength of the
U.S. Capital Markets, CURRENT ISSUES ECON. & FIN. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., New York, N.Y.),
July 2007, at 1 available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci13-6.pdf (noting that
New York City is a leading site for conducting business because the effective performance of U.S.
capital markets).
159
See Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Exchange of Information in Tax Matters with
the United States – The Federal Supreme Court Rejects a First Appeal, at 1 (Jul. 5, 2013),
http://www.bger.ch/fr/press-news-2c_269_2013-eng-t.pdf.
160
See Robert Wood, Swiss Banks Reveal Americans, U.K. Deal Sputters, And Germany Embraces
FATCA, FORBES, Jul. 9, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2013/07/09/swiss-banks-revealamericans-u-k-deal-sputters-and-germany-embraces-fatca/. This was a follow-up to 2011, when Swiss
tax authorities gave the go-ahead to temporarily circumvent Switzerland’s vaunted bank secrecy laws.
161
For a discussion of the 2011 Amendment, see supra notes 46–48.
162
During the March 2014 Senate Hearing on offshore tax evasion, Credit Suisse urged the Senate
to pass the 2011 Amendment, which would “allow for much more information to be provided on U.S.
client accounts to U.S. authorities.” CREDIT SUISSE, LEGACY U.S.-SWISS TAX ISSUES: STATEMENT OF
CREDIT SUISSE, FOR UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 5 (2014). For more on the 2011
156
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Gallen blocked Julius Baer’s transfer of account information to the IRS163
because the IRS’s request did not meet the “level of detail which is required
. . . for which administrative assistance can be granted.”164 Nevertheless,
while the federal court delayed Julius Baer’s release of information given
the circumstances, the decision does not necessarily threaten the core of the
Supreme Court’s July 2013 ruling permitting banks to respond to IRS’s
group requests within sufficient parameters.165
Finally, in September 2013, the Swiss parliament voted in favor of a
Swiss law that requires Swiss banks to report the holdings of U.S. clients to
U.S. tax authorities, essentially enacting FATCA as law.166 The Swiss
House of Representatives and the Senate both approved the law, after the
lower house initially rejected the bill twice and fueled speculation that
Switzerland would not comply with FATCA.167 Thus, Swiss Banking
Association’s “welcoming of the signing of the [U.S.-Swiss Agreement]”
for reducing the “complexity and costs arising from the unilateral FATCA
legislation” seems to have symbolized the country’s willingness to
cooperate with U.S. authorities regarding FATCA.168
2. Impact on the Swiss Banking Industry
The burden of implementing FATCA is substantially impacting the
economic health of the individual Swiss banks as their costs rise and
Amendment, see also supra note 46.
163
See BUNDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT [BVGE] [FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COURT] Jan. 6, 2014,
A-5390/2013 (Switz.), available at http://media.journalofaccountancy.com/JOA/Issues/2014/01
/2013_WEB.pdf.
164
Press Release, Tribunal Administrative Federal, Julius Baer: IRS Request for Administrative
Assistance Not Sufficient for the Disclosure of Client Data, at 1 (Jan. 8, 2014). The Press Release states
that administrative assistance will not be provided for presumed tax evasion, even if high amounts are at
stake” (emphasis added. Id. In this case, the court found that IRS only “abstractly described the conduct
of Julius Baer clients,” and the enclosed indictment of Julius Baer employees does not set forth any
conduct that could be considered as “tax fraud.” Id.
165
See Julius Baer Decision Offers Little Safety for Hidden Swiss Accounts, DAILY TAX REPORT,
Jan. 16, 2014, http://www.bna.com/julius-baer-decision-n17179881397/; Giles Broom, Swiss Court
Blocks Julius Baer Client Data Transfer to U.S., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 8, 2014,
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-08/swiss-court-blocks-julius-baer-client-data-transfer-tou-dot-s.
166
Swiss Parliament Green-Lights US Anti-Tax Evasion Deal, GLOBALPOST, Sep. 9, 2013,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/130909/swiss-parliament-green-lights-us-anti-taxevasion-deal.
167
See
Senate
Approves
FATCA
Legislation,
SWISSINFO.CH,
Sep.
23,
2013,
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/Senate_approves_FATCA_legislation.html?cid=36963642; Kelly
Phillips Erb, After Official Rejection, Holes in Swiss Policy Leave Banking Industry Uncertain, FORBES,
June 23, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2013/06/23/after-official-rejection-holes-inswiss-policy-leave-banking-industry-uncertain/.
168
Press Release, Swiss Bankers Association, Statement From the SBA Regarding the Signing of
the FATCA Agreement (Feb. 14, 2013), http://www.swissbanking.org/en/stellungnahme-20130214.
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margins fall. FATCA is perpetuating the consolidation of Swiss banks that
began during the recession. The consolidation, in conjunction with
international pressure for transparency, is reshaping the look and character
of the Swiss private banking industry.
To start, FATCA is costly for Swiss banks. The Swiss Banking
Association has estimated the implementation costs for FATCA to be
around CHF 200-300 million.169 This is on top of the hefty settlement cost
many banks are enduring for U.S. criminal investigations for facilitating tax
evasion. At the same time, declined margins have now become the norm for
Swiss banks since the recession.170 The decline is attributed to relatively flat
new money, low performance of assets under management, and elevated
competitive and regulatory pressures.171 According to a September 2014
study of Swiss private banks, KPMG found that one-third of Swiss private
banks in its study were in continuing decline, while two-thirds of these
banks posted negative returns in 2013.172 The number of these banks
reporting losses increased more than 50% from 2012 to 2013.173 Further, the
banks in the study that paid for U.S. tax evasion fines and related costs saw
their return on investment decline by negative 8.2 percentage points in
2013.174 These changes undoubtedly impact the Swiss economy, where the
banking sector alone accounts for CHF 35 billion of added value, or 6% of
the overall economy.175
As a result, bank consolidation has become a real phenomenon in
Switzerland.176 KPMG found that January to July 2014 saw M&A activity
169

SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 16 (citing
Von Armando Mombelli, Die USA schlagen eine tiefe Presche ins Bankgeheimnis [The US Rips a Big
Tear Into Banking Secrecy], SWISSINFO.CH (Ger.), June 30, 2014, available at
http://www.swissinfo.ch/ger/die-usa-schlagen-eine-tiefe-bresche-ins-bankgeheimnis/38839962.
Additionally, complying with OECD’s automatic exchange of information regime is expected to cost
Swiss banks another CHF 300-600 million. Id. (citing Manfred Rist, Neue steuerliche Realitäten [New
Tax Realities], NEUE ZÜRICHER ZEITUNG (Ger.), July 21, 2014, available at
http://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/neue-steuerliche-realitaeten-1.18347906 .
170
See KPMG, CLARITY ON PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS 5 (2014), available at
http://www.kpmg.com/CH/en/topics/Pages/performance-swiss-private-banks.aspx
[hereinafter
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS].
171
Id. at 5.
172
Id. at 6, 12.
173
Id. at 8 (finding that 23 banks reported losses in 2012, and 34 banks in 2013).
174
Id. at 41 (noting that these banks represented only one-fifth of all Swiss private banks, so many
more are likely exposed in the coming years). See also supra note 80 and accompanying text (stating
that more than 106 Swiss banks have voluntarily come forward as of January 2014).
175
The Economic Importance of the Swiss Financial Centre, SWISS BANKING,
http://www.swissbanking.org/en/facts_figures.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
176
Swiss private banking business has been going through a fundamental change and facing a
number of challenges, namely increased regulation, consolidation, and declining margins. See DELOITTE
WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTER RANKING 2013, supra note 22; PwC, THE END OF A GOLDEN AGE?
PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY (2013), available at http://www.pwc.ch/user_content/editor/files/publ_
adv/pwc_private_banking_study_2013_e.pdf [hereinafter PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY]; SWISS
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involving almost 10% of the Swiss private banks in its study, involving
around CHF 125 billion in assets under management.177 Smaller Swiss
banks that are more pessimistic about future outlook have been particularly
affected by cross-border regulatory developments and decline in
profitability, and thus driven into consolidation.178 So while small and
medium-sized banks have suffered outflows of assets under management (at
the end of 2013, small banks represented 61.7% of KPMG’s sample but
only 7.8% of total assets under management), large banks have won market
share (from 59% in 2008 to 78% in 2013).179 This is in line with the number
of banks in Switzerland dropping from 338 in 2005 to 283 in 2013, a 16%
decline.180
Since the enactment of FATCA, the pressure for transparency has
impacted the prominent market niche that Switzerland occupied in secret
private banking.181 Most private Swiss banks direct their core efforts on
private banking, exclusively courting high net-worth individuals182 and
focusing on asset management.183 They do not solicit funds from the public,
and do not make loans and investments.184 Private banking is the most
important revenue source for Swiss banks, managing CHF 3.1 billion in
assets and generating gross revenue of 26.5 billion in 2013.185 Since 2007,
Swiss banks have seen a marked downturn in revenue due to a decline in
client assets and increased competition from service providers in clients’
countries of origin, since previous untaxed offshore assets are now
BANKERS ASSOCIATION, WEALTH MANAGEMENT IN SWITZERLAND: STATUS REPORT AND TRENDS
(2011), available at http://www.swissbanking.org/en/20110107-bro-vermoegensverwaltungsgeschaeftrva.pdf. Still, pressure for consolidation remains high for the future. See PERFORMANCE OF SWISS
PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 170 at 19.
177
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 170 at 19, 20.
178
KPMG, DEFINING THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SWISS BANKING 12 (2010), available at
http://www.ifb.unisg.ch/en/Dienste/~/media/Internet/Content/Dateien/InstituteUndCenters/IfB/Services/
Forschungsstudien/Def%20the%20Future%20of%20Swiss%20Private%20Banking2010.ashx. See also
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 172, at 28.
179
PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 172, at 31.
180
SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION, 2014 BANKING BAROMETER: ECONOMIC TRENDS IN THE SWISS
BANKING INDUSTRY 7 (2014), available at http://www.swissbanking.org/en/2014_bankenbarometer
_en.pdf [hereinafter 2014 BANKING BAROMETER].
181
Swiss banks believe that tax transparency places a huge burden on the Swiss financial industry.
See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 11. With FATCA and other automatic exchange of
information systems on the rise, the euphoria of 2010 when the financial industry proposed anonymous
withholding tax has “evaporated.” Id. For a comparison of anonymous withholding versus automatic
exchange of information, see supra Part IV.A. For a discussion on automatic exchange of information as
a new global trend, see infra Part V.
182
See KPMG SWITZ. & UNIV. OF ST. GALLEN, supra note 49, at 6, 7.
183
2014 BANKING BAROMETER, supra note 182, at 6.
184
See Marcia Christoff Kurapovna, Private Banking Is Alive and Well in Switzerland, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 14, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230390240457915143388691
3804.
185
SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 19.
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regulated.186 Singapore and Hong Kong are likely to benefit from the
increasing transparency in Switzerland, and they are quickly catching up to
Switzerland’s status as the top center for wealth management.187 Because of
the competition,188 Swiss banks have been evaluating new business
opportunities, adjusting their footprint in the global banking industry, and
leveraging potential that have not been exhausted.189
As a result of regulatory developments and increased competition,
private banking in Switzerland is experiencing a change in customer base
with a rise in assets from emerging markets. Foreign clients are important
for Swiss banks: as of end of 2013, 51.3% of the CHF 6.1 trillion (about
$3.1 trillion) assets managed in Switzerland were from foreign clients.190
While almost half of the foreign assets under management in 2010 were
from Western Europe and North America, about 55% of foreign assets were
from emerging countries in 2013.191 Thus, growth regions such as the
Middle East, Latin America, and Asia are increasingly important for Swiss
private banking.192 On the other hand, assets from Western Europe and the
U.S. declined due to FATCA and the resulting taxation of assets; Swiss
banks’ business with the most affluent customers was most impacted by this
change.193 The transformation in customer base goes hand in hand with
decrease in profitability, even though the reduction in affluent customers is
partly compensated with inflow of new customers with lower margins.194
In sum, the burden of FATCA has not only affected the economics of
the Swiss banking industry, but it is also altering the look and character of
Swiss private banking.
IV. FATCA’S IMPACT ON SWITZERLAND IN CONTEXT OF
RECENT INTERNATIONAL TRENDS
As a final point, this section will highlight how FATCA’s impact on
186

See PWC PRIVATE BANKING STUDY, supra note 178, at 6. Additionally, price competition has
intensified in the Swiss private banking industry, which further pressurizes margins. Id. As a result, the
banks’ average income per employee reduced by 40%, from CHF 656,000 in 2007 to CHF 395,000 in
2011. Id.
187
DELOITTE WEALTH MANAGEMENT CENTER RANKING 2013, supra note 22, at 24; see also 2014
BANKING BAROMETER, supra note 182, at 21.
188
Survey shows that Swiss banks believe that private banking is a business area where the
competition is especially fierce. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 21.
189
See also AMMANN ET AL., BOOZE & CO., THE FUTURE OF SWISS OFFSHORE PRIVATE BANKING
16–18 (2011), available at http://www.booz.com/media/file/BoozCo-Swiss-Offshore-Private-BankingAbgeltungssteuer-Abkommen.pdf; PERFORMANCE OF SWISS PRIVATE BANKS, supra note 171, at 18.
190
SWISS BANKERS ASSOCIATION & BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 149, at 20.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. Further decline in assets from developed countries is expected for future years. Id. at 22.
194
Id. at 22–23.
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Switzerland is further bolstered by recent international trends moving
toward greater cross-border financial transparency. Automatic exchange of
information has become the standard around the world, and various
international regimes based on IGA Model I are being set up to this effect.
So while FATCA is not an end-all legislation for combating tax
avoidance,195 it certainly drives the current global movement for automatic
exchange of information, and complements a number of international
initiatives that crack down on tax evasion.
First, automatic exchange of information has become the global
norm.196 During the 2013 G20 Summit in St. Petersburg, world leaders
endorsed automatic exchange of information as the new global tax
standard.197 The G20 Leaders’ Declaration announced a plan to begin to
exchange information automatically on tax matters among G20 members by
the end of 2015.198 Consequently, the OECD in July 2014 announced the
Standard for Automatic Exchange of Financial Information in Tax Matters
(the Standard), a single global standard for an automatic exchange of
information between authorities worldwide.199 The Standard contains a
Model Competent Authority Agreement (Model CAA) and the Common
Reporting Due Diligence Standard (CRS), which are similar to and were
built off IGA Model I.200
Following the release of the Standard, the European Commission in
October 2014 agreed on a draft directive to implement the new Standard in
the EU beginning 2017.201 Also in October 2014, 51 jurisdictions signed the
195

One of the biggest issues that commentators have with FATCA is that it is largely unilateral in
U.S. banks’ favor and only adversely affects non-U.S. financial institutions. See also supra note 85.
196
Indeed, a recent survey even revealed that Swiss banks have also accepted the automatic
exchange of information as the new global standard. ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 19 (finding
that about half of the banks surveyed believe that automatic exchange of information will become the
new international standard by 2020).
197
See OECD, G20 LEADERS’ DECLARATION: SAINT PETERSBURG SUMMIT 13 (2013), available at
https://g20.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Saint_Petersburg_Declaration_ENG_0.pdf.; OECD, TAX
ANNEX TO THE ST. PETERSBURG G20 LEADERS’ DECLARATION 2 (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/g20/meetings/saint-petersburg/Tax-Annex-St-Petersburg-G20-LeadersDeclaration.pdf [hereinafter TAX ANNEX].
198
See TAX ANNEX, supra note 199, at 3.
199
See OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT INFORMATION IN
TAX MATTERS (2014), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/
oecd/taxation/standard-for-automatic-exchange-of-financial-account-information-for-taxmatters_9789264216525-en#page1.
200
See BACKGROUND INFORMATION BRIEF, supra note 149, at 5–6. See also OECD, A STEP
CHANGE IN TAX TRANSPARENCY: OECD REPORT FOR THE G8 SUMMIT 5 (2013), available at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchange-of-tax-information/taxtransparency_G8report.pdf.
201
Press Release, Council of the European Union, Combating Tax Evasion: Council Agrees to
Extend
Automatic
Exchange
of
Information
(Oct.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/145103.pdf;
see
also
Memorandum, Council of the European Union, Automatic Exchange of Information: Frequently Asked
Questions (Oct. 15, 2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-591_en.htm.
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first Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement on Automatic Exchange
of Financial Information to automatically exchange information under the
Standard, with Switzerland joining in a month later.202 The competent
authority agreement lays out details of what information will be exchanged
at what time.203 Further, the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange
of Information for Tax Purposes, which includes more than 120 countries
and jurisdictions, has received commitments from over 80 of its members to
implement the new Standard within specific timeframes.204
Finally, implementation of FATCA aligns with the current
international mood against tax avoidance. OECD’s Action Plan on Base
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), endorsed by G20 leaders in July
2013,205 has been hailed as the ultimate constructive move to reform
international taxation policies for multinational enterprises. The BEPS
report recommends 15 specific actions to prevent international tax
avoidance by multinational companies with aggressive tax positions and
lays out a time line for swift implementation of its policies.206 Further,
Switzerland’s neighbors are also coming down on tax avoidance. For
example, U.K.’s General Anti-Abuse Rule (GAAR) came into effect in July
2013 to better define abusive tax arrangements.207 Luxembourg, another
country notoriously known as a safe haven for secret accounts, revealed that
it will begin an automatic exchange of tax data with almost all of EU
202

See Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-oftax-information/multilateral-competent-authority-agreement.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2014). The
multilateral competent authority agreement is based on Article 6 of the Multilateral Convention on
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, as amended by the 2010 Protocol. See OECD, THE
MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON MUTUAL ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANCE IN TAX MATTERS: AMENDED
BY
THE
2010 PROTOCOL (2011), available at http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-AssetManagement/oecd/taxation/the-multilateral-convention-on-mutual-administrative-assistance-in-taxmatters_9789264115606-en#page1. Switzerland joined the multilateral authority agreement on Nov. 19,
2014. Press Release, Swiss Federal Administration, Switzerland Takes Further Step Towards
Introduction of Automatic Exchange of Information (Nov. 19, 2014), available at
https://www.news.admin.ch/message/index.html?lang=en&msg-id=55327.
203
See Multilateral Competent Authority Agreement, supra note 204.
204
Joint Statement by the Early Adopters Group (Oct. 2014), available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-of-tax-information/AEOI-early-adopters-statement.pdf;
OECD,
GLOBAL FORUM ON TRANSPARENCY AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION FOR TAX PURPOSES:
STATEMENT OF OUTCOMES (2014), available at
http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/statement-of-outcomes-gfberlin.pdf.
205
See TAX ANNEX, supra note 199, at 3.
206
See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013), available at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264202719-en; David Zeiler, Corporate Tax Avoidance in the Crosshairs
of OECD Plan, MONEY MORNING, Jul. 15, 2013, http://moneymorning.com/2013/07/15/corporate-taxavoidance-in-the-crosshairs-of-oecd-plan/.
207
See
Finance
Act,
2013,
c.
29,
§§ 206–215
(Eng.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/29/contents/enacted/data.htm; HM Revenue & Customs, The
General Anti-Abuse Rule, HMRC.GOV.UK (last visited Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/
avoidance/gaar.htm.
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member nations beginning on January 1, 2015.208
To conclude, various international agreements and plans in the
pipeline indicate a general movement toward greater taxing transparency,
particularly in regards to automatic exchange of information. This will
further cement the lasting impact that FATCA has on the Swiss banking
industry.
CONCLUSION
With FATCA enforcement beginning in 2014 against a backdrop of
greater international scrutiny for transparency, one can expect to see great
changes in the Swiss banking industry. Switzerland’s participation in U.S.
and international regimes for greater exchange of information has lead way
to an unprecedented amount of disclosure, assistance, and cooperation by
Swiss banks. Throughout this process, there has been a full-fledged debate
in Switzerland: is moving toward transparency a betrayal of Swiss values as
a disinterested Alpine nation, or is Switzerland ready for a fundamental
shift in its belief in privacy?209 The answer to this debate seems to lean on
the latter, but moving forward, the debate will certainly shape Switzerland’s
historical and cultural identification with neutrality, privacy, and
independence.210 Swiss banks are hopefully optimistic through the tough
conditions211 – in the short term, Switzerland is still expected to remain as
the largest single offshore center, with about 25% of total offshore wealth
by the end of 2017.212 Yet, in this new era of tax and banking transparency,
how Switzerland’s reputation will change in the long term remains to be
seen.
208

See FAQ: Introducing automatic exchange of information in Luxembourg, LUXEMBOURG
MINISTRY
OF
FIN.
(Apr.
10,
2013),
http://www.mf.public.lu/actualites/2013
/04/faq_aut_exchange_1004131/index.html; Stephanie Bodoni & Rebecca Christie, Luxembourg to Ease
Bank
Secrecy
Rule,
Share
Data
in
2015,
BLOOMBERG,
Apr.
10,
2013,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-04-10/luxembourg-to-ease-bank-secrecy-rule-share-data-in2015.html.
209
See Emma Thomasson, Special Report: the Battle for the Swiss Soul, REUTERS, Apr. 18, 2013,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/18/us-swiss-banks-specialreport-idUSBRE93H07620130418.
While Conservative politician Christoph Darbellay publicly called Wegelin executives “traitors” that
dragged Swiss finance through the dirt, Josef Ackermann, the chairman of Zurich Insurance, called on
Switzerland to resist international attacks. Id.
210
See Kim Hjelmgaard, Secret’s Out on the Swiss Bank Account, USA TODAY, Jan. 22, 2014,
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/22/swiss-banking-secrecy/4390231/ (noting that in
response to the stable society and well-developed banking industry, the Swiss ended up developing
concealment as a cornerstone of the country’s cultural identity); Kurapovna, supra note 186 (“the Swiss
sense of privacy and independence—ingrained over so many centuries of remaining neutral while
surrounded by teetering monarchies, a hostile Wehrmacht next door and nestled close to half a continent
under communist control—is not about to wither away so easily.”).
211
See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 81, at 11.
212
BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, supra note 5, at 12.
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